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Abstract
In this work, we investigate two source coding models, a Helper problem and a Gray-Wyner problem,
under equivocation constraints. Specifically, in the Helper problem, an encoder communicates with a
legitimate receiver through a noise-free rate-limited public link as well as a noise-free rate-limited pri-
vate link; and an external passive eavesdropper intercepts every information that is sent on the public
link. We study two classes of this model: i) when a pair of arbitrarily correlated discrete memoryless
sources is to be encoded such that one component has to be recovered lossily at the legitimate receiver
while the equivocation about both components at the eavesdropper must be maintained no smaller
than some prescribed level; and ii) when the legitimate receiver reproduces both components, one of
which, that is recovered losslessly, has to be concealed from the eavesdropper to some equivocation
level. For both classes of Helper problems, we establish single-letter characterizations of optimal rate-
distortion-equivocation tradeoffs in the discrete memoryless case. Next, we extend our results to the
case of two legitimate receivers, i.e., Gray-Wyner type network model with equivocation constraints.
Here, two legitimate receivers are connected to the encoder each through a dedicated error-free private
link as well as a common error-free public link; and an external passive eavesdropper overhears on the
public link. We study two classes of this model that are extensions of the aforementioned instances of
Helper problems to the case of two receivers. For each of the two classes, we establish a single-letter
characterization of the optimal rate-distortion-equivocation region. Throughout the paper, the analysis
sheds light on the role of the private links, and we illustrate the results by computing them for some
binary examples. Also, we make some meaningful connections, e.g., with problems of secret-sharing
and encryption.
I. Introduction
Since its introduction by Shannon in the fifties, information theoretic security has motivated ex-
tensive research, in diverse directions. However, much of this research is directed towards channel
coding models, e.g., the wiretap channel [1], the broadcast channel with confidential messages [2]
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2and numerous extensions of these works to vector wiretap channels [3]–[6] as well as various multi-
terminal settings such as the multiple access wiretap channel [7]–[10], the relay channel [11], the
interference channel [12] and X networks [13], [14] (the reader may refer to [15] for a review of
many other related contributions). Secrecy-oriented source coding models, however, have attracted
less interest comparatively, and are way less well understood in general. Perhaps, this is due to the
source-channel coding separation which is often applied, though generally suboptimal; or the folklore
interpretation that information secrecy is generally facilitated by injecting additional ”noise” on the
channels to eavesdroppers.
One important source coding model with secrecy constraints, which was studied by Yamamoto
in [16], is shown in Figure 1. In this model, an encoder observes a pair of arbitrarily correlated discrete-
memoryless (DM) sources (Sn1 ,S
n
2), and communicates with a receiver over a noise-free rate-limited
public communication channel of capacity R. An external eavesdropper intercepts all information on
the public link. The goal of the communication is to allow the legitimate receiver to reproduce the
source component Sn1 lossily, i.e., to within some desired average fidelity level D, while maintaining
the equivocation at the eavesdropper about the source component Sn2 no smaller than some prescribed
level ∆. Yamamoto characterized in [16] the region of optimal tradeoff among compression ratio R,
average distortion D and equivocation ∆. From a practical viewpoint, the model of Figure 1 can
be useful to model scenarios in which some critical information (e.g., medical information about a
patient) or specific feature of a source needs to be kept secret from adversarial interceptions.
Fig. 1: Yamamoto’s model for secure lossy source coding
In Yamamoto’s setting, since the entire information that is transmitted to the legitimate receiver
gets intercepted by the eavesdropper, perfect secrecy sometimes comes at the price of no transmission
at all (e.g., think about the case in which Sn1 = S
n
2 = S
n and Sn is to be recovered losslessly at the
legitimate receiver). In this work, we investigate two related models in which legitimate receivers also
have dedicated links on which they communicate with the encoder, and that cannot be intercepted
by the eavesdropper. This is in accordance with the observation that secrecy is generally obtained
by creating some advantage for legitimate receivers over eavesdroppers or adversaries. Specifically,
we study a Helper problem and a Gray-Wyner model, both with equivocation constraints. The two
models are described in the following two sections, together with our main contributions for each of
them.
A. Helper Model and Contributions
Consider the model shown in Figure 2. In this model, an encoder observes a pair of arbitrarily
correlated memoryless sources (Sn0 ,S
n
1) and communicates with a legitimate receiver through a noise-
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3free rate-limited public link as well as a noise-free rate-limited private link, in the presence of an
external passive eavesdropper which intercepts every information that is sent on the public link. For
convenience, and with some abuse in the terminology, we interpret the transmission on the private
link as being enabled by a Helper node that observes the same sources and whose role is to facilitate
the communication between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair. (Formally, this is then an instance
of the more general Helper problem in which the helper node observes a distinct, possibly correlated,
source).
We study two classes of this model. In the first class, shown in Figure 2a, the communication should
allow the legitimate receiver to reproduce only the source component Sn1 lossily, to within some desired
average distortion D1, while maintaining the equivocation at the eavesdropper about both sources
(Sn0 ,S
n
1) no smaller than some prescribed level ∆. In this model, the encoder sends descriptions of
the pair (Sn0 ,S
n
1) on both links. Let R denote the rate of the compression index (or message) that the
encoder sends on the public link, and R1 that on the private link. Depending on the values of D1 and
∆, the communication strikes a good balance among revealing enough information to the legitimate
receiver using both links and leaking only minimum information to the eavesdropper on the public
link (about the sources themselves, not the compression indices).
In the second class, shown in Figure 2b, the legitimate receiver wants to reproduce both sources
– the source component Sn0 is reconstructed in a lossless manner and the source component S
n
1 is
reconstructed in a lossy manner, to within some average distortion D1. However, in this model, only
the source Sn0 represents sensitive information, and the communication is required to maintain the
equivocation about it at the eavesdropper bounded from below by some prescribed level ∆.
(a) Equivocation on both sources (b) Reproducing both sources
Fig. 2: Two classes of Helper problems with equivocation constraints
Although seemingly similar, the aforementioned two classes of Helper problems with equivocation
constraints exhibit different coding challenges. For example, while in the model of Figure 2a the source
component Sn0 , which has to be kept secret to some level, needs in principle not be transmitted, it is
required by the legitimate receiver in the model of Figure 2b. Conversely, there is a stronger restriction
on the use of the public link in the model of Figure 2a, since, in the model of Figure 2b, descriptions of
Sn1 that leak only minimum information about S
n
0 can still be transmitted on the public link. However,
in the investigation of both models, equally important is the understanding of the role of the private
link. We will show that the two models require different ways of using this link optimally. In fact, by
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4opposition to Yamamoto’s setting of Figure 1, the presence of this link in the models that we study
makes the derivation of optimal results (in terms of rate-distortion-equivocation) rather challenging.
For both classes of Helper problems, we establish single-letter characterizations of optimal rate-
distortion-equivocation tradeoffs in the discrete memoryless case. For the model of Figure 2a, the
optimal coding scheme is one in which the encoder sends a description of the pair (Sn0 ,S
n
1) on the
public link, which is then utilized as side information at both encoder and decoder to send another
description of (Sn0 ,S
n
1) on the private link. It is important to note that, in doing so, although the source
component Sn0 is not required by the legitimate receiver and is to be kept secret (to some level) at
the eavesdropper, the description that is sent on the public link is arbitrarily correlated with Sn0 , an
aspect that appears also in Yamamoto’s optimal coding [16, Theorem 1] for the model of Figure 1
and is useful to enabling smaller equivocations at the eavesdropper.
For the model of Figure 2b, an optimal coding scheme is one in which the encoder describes the
entire Sn0 through the private link and uses the remaining of the capacity of this link, as well as the
public link, to describe the source component Sn1 to the legitimate receiver. In doing so, it takes into
account Sn0 as side information that is available at both encoder and decoder. Recalling that the source
Sn1 is arbitrarily correlated with the source S
n
0 which is to be kept secret from the eavesdropper, the
analysis of the equivocation of this scheme requires showing that the compression index of Sn1 that is
sent on the public link leaks no information about Sn0 , which we prove through a here established new
counting lemma. Furthermore, we establish some meaningful connections with the problem of secret-
sharing and encryption, by showing that the private link can be utilized optimally in, essentially, two
different ways, i) revealing the part of the sources that is to be kept secret to the legitimate receiver,
or ii) enabling the encoder and legitimate receiver to share a common secret key which they then
utilize to encrypt the part of the source that is to be secured on the public link, using a one time-pad
approach which is reminiscent of encryption in conventional cryptosystems [17]. Finally, for both
classes of models, we illustrate the results by computing the established regions for some binary
examples.
B. Gray-Wyner Model and Contributions
Next, we study generalizations of the aforementioned models to the case of two legitimate re-
ceivers, i.e., a Gray-Wyner network [18] with equivocation constraints, as shown in Figure 3. Here,
the transmitter communicates with two legitimate receivers, each over a dedicated noise-free rate-
limited private link as well as a common noise-free rate-limited public link; while an external passive
eavesdropper overhears the public link. We study two classes of models. In the first class, shown
in Figure 3a, the encoder observes a pair of arbitrarily correlated memoryless sources (Sn1 ,S
n
2) and
wishes to describe the source Sn1 to the first receiver and the source S
n
2 to the second receiver. Both
reconstructions are performed in a lossy manner, to within some desired average distortions D1
and D2 respectively; and the communication should maintain the equivocation at the eavesdropper
about both sources no smaller than some prescribed level ∆. In this model, the imposed secrecy
constraint may lead (depending on the value of ∆) to rate redundancy on the private links; and the
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5communication should strike a good balance among the compression rate R1 on the private link to
the first receiver, the compression rate R2 on the private link to the second receiver, the compression
rate R on the public link, the desired distortion pair (D1,D2) and the prescribed equivocation level ∆.
In the second class of the models that we study, shown in Figure 3b, we introduce a third source
component, Sn0 , that may represent the common information between S
n
1 and S
n
2 – the source triple
(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) are arbitrarily correlated, however, and S
n
1 and S
n
2 need not be independent conditionally
on Sn0 . Also, we restrict the secrecy constraint to be only about S
n
0 . Specifically, both receivers want to
reproduce Sn0 in a lossless manner; and the equivocation at the eavesdropper about this component
should be no smaller than some desired level ∆. In addition, Receiver 1 wants to reconstruct the
source Sn1 lossily to within average distortion D1, and the second receiver wants to reconstruct the
source Sn2 lossily to within average distortion D2. Recalling that for the original Gray-Wyner network
without secrecy constraints [18] optimal coding necessitates that the source component Sn0 , and also
any common information of the sources Sn1 and S
n
2 conditionally on S
n
0 , should be transmitted on the
public link, it is clear that the imposed secrecy constraint changes drastically the problem. In fact,
depending on the desired equivocation level, there is a tension among saving rate by sending Sn0 on
the public link and revealing only minimum information about it to the eavesdropper.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Two classes of Gray-Wyner problems with equivocation constraints
For both classes of Gray-Wyner problems, we establish single-letter characterizations of optimal
rate-distortion-equivocation tradeoffs in the discrete memoryless case. For the model of Figure 3b,
perhaps non-intuitively, the analysis shows that the price of the imposed secrecy constraint is to send
the source component Sn0 on both private links, even though this entails some rate redundancy that
otherwise could be saved if there were no eavesdropper.
The models of Figure 2 and of Figure 3 may be useful to model communication scenarios in
which adversaries cannot intercept data on certain communication resources, e.g., time or frequency
bands. For example, in the context of on-line caching, caching phases may be designed by the system
operator on resources (time, frequency, code) that users cannot know apriori. Conversely, delivery
phases usually happen during large traffic periods; and, so, transmission during this phase is more
likely to be intercepted comparatively. Another driving problem, of interest in this setting, is a sensor
network setting in which multiple sensors observe an underlying phenomenon that needs to be
reconstructed at some access point. While some of the network connections may be secured (possibly
wired), others might be wireless and so subjected to eavesdropping.
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6C. Related Work
Most related to this contribution are works on secure transmission from a source coding perspective.
A pioneering line of work in this aspect targets exploiting correlation among observations or sources at
multiple terminals to generate secret common randomness which then may be utilized to encrypt data
that is independent from the observations. The reader may refer to Maurer [19], Ahlswede-Csisza´r [20]
and Csisza´r-Narayan [21] seminal papers for more on this line of work. In [22], Prabhakaran and
Ramchandran study a setup in which the correlated observations or sources are themselves the data
that needs to be communicated. Specifically, they study a Slepian-Wolf setting [23] in the presence
of an eavesdropper with a correlated observation in which the goal is to convey the transmitter’s
source observation losslessly to the receiver while revealing the least amount of information about
it to an eavesdropper that overhears the transmission. They characterize the optimal (minimum)
leakage rate in this case. Perhaps of some importance is the observation, revealed therein through a
simple example, that, unlike the setting without secrecy constraints, i.e., the standard Slepian-Wolf
model [23], knowledge of decoder’s side information at the transmitter is generally beneficial to enable
higher equivocation at the eavesdropper. Also, Prabhakaran and Ramchandran consider a variation
of the model in which the transmitter and receiver are allowed to interact over multiple rounds and
they establish a lower bound on the leakage rate through connection with secret-sharing. In [22], no
communication rate constraints are imposed on the sources. In [24] (see also [25]), Gunduz et al. study
a related setting in which communication rate constraints are put on the sources. They consider both
cases of coded and non-coded side information at the legitimate receiver. In the case of uncoded side
information at the legitimate receiver, a complete characterization of the rate-equivocation region is
established; and in the case of coded side information, bounds on this region, that do not match in
general, are provided. In [26], Tandon et al. study a secure lossless source coding problem with a
rate-limited Helper. In this work, they also consider a variation of the model in which the encoder
has access to the coded output of the Helper. For both cases, they characterize the optimal rate-
equivocation region. Other related works can be found in [27]–[30].
D. Outline and Notation
An outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II is dedicated to the Helper
models with equivocation constraints of Figure 2. After some formal definitions of the studied system
models in Section II-A, we characterize the associated optimal rate-distortion equivocation regions in
subsection II-B and subsection II-C respectively. Section III is devoted to the Gray-Wyner models with
equivocation constraints of Figure 3. We define the two models formally in Section III-A, and then
we characterize the associated rate-distortion-equivocation regions in Section III-B and Section III-C
respectively. Sections II and III also contain some binary examples, as well as some useful discussions.
The proofs are relegated to the appendices.
Throughout the paper we use the following notations. The term p.m.f. stands for probability mass
function. Upper case letters are used to denote random variables, e.g., X; lower case letters are used
to denote realizations of random variables, e.g., x; and calligraphic letters designate alphabets, i.e.,
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7X. Vectors of length n are denoted by Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn), and X ji is used to denote the sequence
(Xi, . . . ,X j). The probability distribution of a random variable X is denoted by PX(x) , P(X = x).
Sometimes, for convenience, we write it as PX. We use the notation EX[·] to denote the expectation
of random variable X. A probability distribution of a random variable Y given X is denoted by PY|X.
The set of probability distributions defined on an alphabet X is denoted by P(X). The cardinality of
a set X is denoted by ‖X‖. For random variables X, Y and Z, the notation X −
− Y −
− Z indicates
that X, Y and Z, in this order, form a Markov Chain, i.e., PXYZ(x, y, z) = PY(y)PX|Y(x|y)PZ|Y(z|y). The
set T (n)[X] denotes the set of sequences strongly typical with respect to the probability distribution PX
and the set T (n)[X|yn] denotes the set of sequences xn jointly typical with yn with respect to the joint
p.m.f. PXY. Throughout this paper, we use h2(α) to denote the entropy of a Bernoulli (α) source, i.e.,
h2(α) = −α log(α) − (1 − α) log(1 − α). Also, the indicator function is denoted by 1(·). For real-valued
scalars a and b, with a ≤ b, the notation [a, b] means the set of reals that are larger or equal than a
and smaller or equal b. For integers i ≤ j, [i : j] denotes the set of integers comprised between i and
j, i.e., [i : j] = {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. Finally, throughout the paper, logarithms are taken to base 2.
II. Secure Lossy Helper Problems
In this section, we study the model of Figure 2. It is assumed that the alphabets S0, S1 and S2 are
finite.
A. System Models and Definitions
Consider the two classes of Helper problems with equivocations constraints shown in Figure 2. For
brevity, we provide full formal definitions for the model of Figure 2a; and only outline the differences
for the model of Figure 2b.
The lossy Helper problem with equivocation constraint of Figure 2a is defined by a source alphabet
(S0,S1), a joint input p.m.f. PS0,S1 , a reconstruction alphabet Sˆ1 and a distortion measure defined as:
d1 : S1 × Sˆ1 → [0 : ∞)
(s1, sˆ1) → d1(s1, sˆ1) .
(1)
Definition 1. An (n,Mn,M1,n) code for the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2a consists
in:
i) Two message sets Mn = [1 : Mn] and M1,n = [1 : M1,n].
ii) Two encoding functions f and f1 defined as:
f : Sn0 × Sn1 → [1 : Mn]
(Sn0 ,S
n
1) → W = f (Sn0 ,Sn1)
(2)
and
f1 : Sn0 × Sn1 → [1 : M1,n]
(Sn0 ,S
n
1) → W1 = f1(Sn0 ,Sn1) .
(3)
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8iii) A decoding functions g defined as:
g : [1 : Mn] × [1 : M1,n] → Sˆn1
(W,W1) → Sˆn1 .
(4)
The average distortion and equivocation of a code are defined respectively as
d(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d1(S1,i, Sˆ1,i) and
1
n
H(Sn0 ,S
n
1 |W). (5)
A rate-distortion-equivocation quadruple (R,R1,D1,∆) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of
(n,Mn,M1,n) codes such that
lim sup
n→∞
log2(Mn) ≤ R , (5a)
lim sup
n→∞
log2(M1,n) ≤ R1 , (5b)
lim sup
n→∞
E
(
d(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1)
)
≤ D1 , (5c)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn0 ,S
n
1 |W) ≥ ∆ . (5d)
The rate-distortion-equivocation region is the set of all achievable quadruples (R,R1,D1,∆).
Definition 2. An (n,Mn,M1,n) code for the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2b is defined
similarly, but with the decoding function g at the legitimate receiver being a mapping
g : [1 : Mn] × [1 : M1,n] → Sˆn0×Sˆn1
(W,W1) → (Sˆn0 , Sˆn1) .
(6)
The average distortion and equivocation level achieved by such a code are given respectively by
d(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
d1(S1,i, Sˆ1,i) and
1
n
H(Sn0 |W). (7)
A rate-distortion-equivocation quadruple (R,R1,D,∆) is said to be achievable if, similarly, (5a)-(5c) are satisfied,
along with a distinct equivocation constraint
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn0 |W) ≥ ∆ (8)
and where the probability of error, defined as
P(n)e , P
(
Sˆn0 , S
n
0
)
, (9)
is such that
lim sup
n→∞
P(n)e = 0. (10)
B. Helper Model with Equivocation on Both Sources
Consider the Helper problem with equivocation constraint imposed on both sources of Figure 2a. In
what follows, we provide a single-letter characterization of the optimal rate-distortion-equivocation
region of this model, discuss the role of the private link and illustrate the result through a binary
example.
The following theorem states the optimal rate-distortion-equivocation region of the model of Figure 2a.
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9Theorem 1. A rate-distortion-equivocation quadruple (R,R1,D1,∆) is achievable for the Helper model with
equivocation constraint of Figure 2a if and only if
R1 ≥ I(S0,S1; Sˆ1|U) (11a)
R ≥ I(U; S0,S1) (11b)
∆ ≤ H(S0,S1|U) , (11c)
for some joint probability mass function PUS0S1Sˆ1 that satisfies Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 .
Proof. A detailed proof of the direct part, as well as of the converse part, of Theorem 1 are reported
in Appendix A. Hereafter, we provide a brief outline of the achievability proof. The encoder finds a
description Un that is strongly jointly typical with the pair (Sn0 ,S
n
1) and transmits it on the public link.
It can do so as long as n is large and R ≥ I(U; S0,S1). Then, accounting for that this description Un is
available as a side information sequence at both encoder and decoder, it finds another description Sˆn1
(superimposed on Un) that is strongly jointly typical with (Sn0 ,S
n
1) conditionally on U
n, and transmits
it on the private link. Again, it can do so as long as n is large and R1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S0,S1|U). The analysis
of the equivocation of this scheme, detailed in Appendix A, shows that it is given by the conditional
entropy H(S0,S1|U). 
The following corollary specializes the result of Theorem 1 to the case of lossless reconstruction of
the source Sn1 at the legitimate receiver.
Corollary 1. In the case of lossless reconstruction of the source Sn1 , i.e., D1 = 0, a rate-equivocation triple
(R,R1,∆) is achievable for the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2a if and only if
R + R1 ≥ H(S1) (12a)
∆ ≤ H(S0|S1) + min{ R1, H(S1)} . (12b)
Proof. The proof of Corollary 1 appears in Appendix B. 
Remark 1. Although the legitimate receiver requires only the source component Sn1 in the model of Figure 2a,
and the source component Sn0 is to be kept secret (to some level) from the eavesdropper, the description U
n that
is sent on the public link depends not only on Sn1 but also on S
n
0 (the a.r.v. U is arbitrarily correlated with
(S0,S1) in Theorem 1). This aspect, which appears here only due to the imposed equivocation constraint, is
reminiscent of Yamamoto’s result [16] that a strictly smaller equivocation level is achieved if the encoder does
not observe the source Sn2 to keep secret in the model of Figure 1. 
Remark 2. Investigating the proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix B it can be noted that the optimal choice of
the auxiliary random variable U in Theorem 1 satisfies the Markov chain U −
− S1 −
− S0. This means that by
opposition to the lossy case, encoder side information Sn0 does not enable strictly higher equivocation levels at
the eavesdropper in the case of lossless reconstruction of the source Sn1 . 
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Remark 3. The model of Figure 1, in the case in which S2 = (S0,S1), can be obtained as a special case of that
of Figure 2a by setting R1 = 0. Thus, in this case, the result of Theorem 1 generalizes that of [16, Theorem
1] to the case in which the legitimate receiver also has a noise-free rate-limited private link. 
Remark 4. In [26], Tandon et al. study a model in which an encoder transmits a memoryless source Xn to
the legitimate receiver losslessly, over a noise-free rate-limited public link on which listens an external passive
eavesdropper. The receiver is assisted with a rate-limited helper that observes an arbitrarily correlated source
Yn. They characterize the optimal rate-equivocation region of this model. In the case in which the encoder
and helper observe the same source, our result of Theorem 1 generalizes that of [26] to the lossy reproduction
setting. 
The following corollary specializes the result of Theorem 1 to the case of a single source, i.e.,
S0 = S1 = S.
Corollary 2 (Single Source). In the case of one source, i.e., S0 = S1 = S in the model of Figure 2a, the
rate-distortion-equivocation region is given by the set of quadruples (R,R1,D,∆) such that
R1 ≥ I(S; Sˆ|U) (13a)
R ≥ I(U; S) (13b)
∆ ≤ H(S|U) (13c)
for some joint distribution PUSSˆ that satisfies Ed1(S, Sˆ) ≤ D1.
Fig. 4: Rate-equivocation region for the secure lossless Helper problem
In the case of lossless reconstruction of the source Sn, the rate-equivocation region of Corollary 2
can also be obtained from Corollary 1 by setting S0 = S1 = S therein. As expected in this case, in
order to guarantee full equivocation at the eavesdropper, i.e., ∆ = H(S), information has to transit
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through the private link which then should have capacity no smaller than H(S) – the public link can
carry independent information, but not any useful information about S. (A useful connection with
secret-sharing and encryption based schemes, in which even the public link can carry an encrypted
version of the source, will be made in the next section). In the case in which R1 < H(S), perfect secrecy
is not possible, and the equivocation at the eavesdropper is given by the amount of information that
it does not intercept, i.e., R1 precisely.
C. Helper Model with Reproduction of Both Sources
Consider the Helper problem of Figure 2b, with the equivocation constraint ∆ imposed only on
the source component Sn0 and the legitimate receiver reproducing the source S
n
0 losslessly and the
source Sn1 lossily, to within average distortion D1. As it will become apparent from the discussion that
will follow, the analysis of this model is less easy than that of the model of Figure 2a in which the
legitimate receiver reproduces only the source component Sn1 .
1) Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region: The following theorem states the optimal rate-distortion-
equivocation region of the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2b.
Theorem 2. A rate-distortion-equivocation triple (R,R1,D1) is achievable for the Helper model with equivo-
cation constraint of Figure 2b if and only if
R + R1 ≥ H(S0) + min
PSˆ1 |S0 ,S1
I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) , (14a)
∆ ≤ min{H(S0),R1} , (14b)
for some conditional PSˆ1 |S0,S1 that satisfies Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 .
Proof. Detailed proofs of the direct and converse parts of Theorem 2 appear in Appendix C. Hereafter
we provide a brief outline of the proof of achievability. The encoder uses both private and public
links to describe the source Sn0 losslessly to the legitimate receiver. In doing so, the rate splitting of
the required H(S0) bits per sample among the two links is dictated by desired level of equivocation
∆ about the source Sn0 at the eavesdropper. Then, conditioned on S
n
0 , the encoder describes the source
Sn1 through both private and common links, accounting for S
n
0 as a side information sequence that
is available at both encoder and decoder. More specifically, the coding scheme that we use for the
proof of Theorem 2 uses a careful combination of binning and rate-splitting. Let R1 = R1,1 + R1,0 and
R = R0,0 + R0,1. Assign the set of typical Sn0 ’s to 2
n(R0,0+R1,0) bins indexed with w0,0 = 1, . . . , 2nR0,0 and
w1,0 = 1, . . . , 2nR1,0 . For every typical Sn0 , generate 2
n(R1,1+R0,1) independent sequences Sˆn1(w1,1,w0,1), each
i.i.d. according to the product of PSˆ1 |S0 , indexed with w1,1 = 1, . . . , 2
nR1,1 and w0,1 = 1, . . . , 2nR0,1 . For
every typical pair (Sn0 ,S
n
1), the encoder finds the indices (w0,0,w1,0) of the bin in which lies S
n
0 , and
then finds a pair (w1,1,w0,1) such that Sˆn(w1,1,w0,1) is strongly jointly typical with Sn1 conditionally
on Sn0 . It can do so as long as n is large, R0,0 + R1,0 ≥ H(S0) and R1,1 + R0,1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1|S0). Next, the
encoder transmits the indices w0,0 and w0,1 on the public link and the indices w1,0 and w1,1 on the
private link. A block diagram of the indices and their transmission on the public and private links
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is shown in Figure 5. The legitimate receiver first recovers Sn0 and then reconstructs the description
of Sn1 as Sˆ
n
1(w1,1,w0,1). Recalling that the source S
n
1 is arbitrarily correlated with the source S
n
0 which
to be kept secret to within equivocation level ∆ at the eavesdropper, the analysis of the equivocation
of this scheme requires showing that the compression index w0,1 of Sn1 that is sent on the public link
leaks no additional information about Sn0 beyond what the transmission of the index w0,0 of S
n
0 on the
public link leaks about this source, which we prove through a here established new counting lemma
(see Lemma 1 in Appendix C or a different proof of a similar result in [31]).
Fig. 5: Block diagram of the compression indices and transmission on the public and private links
for the model of Figure 2b.

The following corollary specializes the result of Theorem 2 to the case of maximum equivocation
at the eavesdropper, i.e., ∆ = H(S0).
Corollary 3 (Case of Perfect Secrecy). For the Helper model of Figure 2b, a rate-distortion triple (R,R1,D1)
is achievable with perfect secrecy if and only if
R1 ≥ H(S0) (15a)
R + R1 ≥ H(S0) + min
PSˆ1 |S0S1
I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) (15b)
for some conditional PSˆ1 |S0S1 that satisfies Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 .
The following remarks help understanding better the result of Theorem 2. They also provide some
useful connections with secret-sharing and encryption-based schemes, as well as results from related
previous work.
Remark 5. In the case of a single source Sn0 that is to be conveyed losslessly to the legitimate receiver and
kept secret from the eavesdropper, i.e., S1 = ∅ or, equivalently, D1 = ∞, the result of Theorem 2 reduces, under
perfect secrecy ,i.e. ∆ = H(S0), to R1 ≥ H(S0), which is consistent with the observation that, in this case,
secure transmission is possible only through the private link which then should have its capacity no smaller
than H(S0) in order for the encoder to describe Sn0 losslessly to the legitimate receiver. The result in this specific
case can also be inferred from [26] and [27]. Also, without the secrecy constraint, i.e. ∆ = 0, the model of
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Figure 2b reduces to a multiple descriptions problem with combined reconstruction only [32, page 323]; and
the rate region, which is symmetric in R and R1 in this case, is described by the single constraint (15b). 
Remark 6. By opposition to the model of Figure 2a in which the constraint of perfect secrecy precludes the
usage of the public link, for the model of Figure 2b this link can still be utilized, e.g., to transmit a description
of the part of Sn1 that is not correlated with S
n
0 (i.e., the innovation of S
n
1 relative to S
n
0 or S
n
1 conditionally
on Sn0). Recalling that the associated compression index can be shown to be independent of the source S
n
0 (see
Lemma 1 in Appendix C, or an alternate proof in [31, Section III]), this leaks no additional information about
Sn0 to the eavesdropper as we already mentioned in the outline proof of achievability. 
Remark 7. In the above outlined coding scheme of Theorem 2, the uncertainty at the eavesdropper is induced
only through appropriate binning. For instance, no encryption is utilized. The reader may wonder whether
alternate coding schemes that rely on encryption and/or secret-sharing can be employed, since some common
randomness can be shared through the private link and then utilized for the transmission on the public link.
In the next section we develop a coding scheme that is equally optimal and is based on secret-sharing and
encryption. For example, in the case of perfect secrecy, i.e., ∆ = H(S0), for coding schemes without encryption
or secret sharing the constraint R1 ≥ H(S0) of the converse part of Corollary 3 simply means that the source
Sn0 that is to be kept secret should be sent entirely only through the private link (so as not to be intercepted
by the eavesdropper). Alternatively, for coding schemes that are based on encryption or secret sharing, this
constraint expresses the fact that, for the source Sn0 to be transmitted directly over the public link without
leaking any information about it to the eavesdropper, the key utilized for its encryption or that shared through
secret-sharing approaches should be at least H(S0) bits long. 
2) Alternate Coding Scheme: Secret-Sharing and Encryption:
In this section, we develop an alternate optimal coding scheme for the Helper model with equiv-
ocation constraint of Figure 2b. By opposition to the scheme of Theorem 2, this scheme utilizes the
private link as a means of sharing secret between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, in the
form of all or part of the source Sn1 . The shared secret is then utilized as a key to encrypt all or part of
the source Sn0 , depending on the desired level of equivocation and transmit it directly over the public
link. The result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2b, there is an alternate coding scheme
that utilizes secret-sharing and encryption which is optimal, i.e., achieves the rate-distortion-equivocation-region
of Theorem 2.
Proof. A formal proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix E. The coding scheme is similar to that of
Theorem 2; and so, hereafter, we only outline the main steps of it. Recall the rate splitting and the
binning used in the coding scheme of Theorem 2. Also, recall the following important two elements
therein: i) the index w1,1, which together with w0,1 identify the sequence Sˆn1(w1,1,w0,1) that is found
jointly typical with Sn1 conditionally on S
n
0 , is transmitted over the private link; and ii) the index w1,0,
which together with w0,0 identify the bin in which lies the source Sn0 , is transmitted over the private
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link. In the coding scheme that we use to show Theorem 3, the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair
use the index w1,1 of the description of the source Sn1 as a secret-key. Specifically, the encoder encrypts
the message w1,0 by taking the bit-wise modulo-2 sum of the binary expansion of w1,0 and w1,1; and
transmits it over the public link. If the rate of the message w1,1 that is utilized as a secret key does
not suffice to encrypt all of w1,0, only part of the latter is encrypted. 
3) Binary Example: Consider the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2b. Let
(S0,S1) ∼ DSBS(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1], i.e., S0 = S1 = {0, 1} and for (s0, s1) ∈ {0, 1}2,
PS0,S1 (s0, s1) =
1 − p
2
δ(s0, s1) +
p
2
(1 − δ(s0, s1)) . (16)
Also, assume a Hamming distortion measure dH. In this case, it is easy to see that
min
PSˆ1 |S0S1
I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) = [h2(p) − h2(D1)]+ , (17)
where the minimum is achieved with the choice of the test channel Sˆ1 = S1 ⊕ S0 ⊕ U and U is a
Bernoulli random variable with parameter
( p−2D1
2p−1
)
. Thus, for this binary example, Theorem 2 reduces
to the set of quadruples (R,R1,D1,∆) that satisfy
Rsecret :
 R + R1 ≥ 1 + [h2(p) − h2(D1)]
+
∆ ≤ min{1,R1}
(18)
This region is shown in Figure 6 where we project over all possible equivocation levels. For compar-
ison reasons, the figure also shows the rate-distortion region of this example if there were no secrecy
constraint, i.e., the region defined by
R0 : R + R1 ≥ 1 + [h2(p) − h2(D1)]+ . (19)
The shaded region in the figure delimits the region in which perfectly secure transmission is not
possible.
Fig. 6: Secure rate-distortion region of the Helper problem of Figure 2b. Case of DSBS(p) sources
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D. Digression
Consider again the Helper model with equivocation constraint of Figure 2. A more general setting,
not treated in this paper, is one in which the role of the encoder is to convey (only) the source
component Sn1 to the legitimate receiver lossily, i.e., to within some desired fidelity level D1, while
maintaining the equivocation about (only) the source component Sn0 at the eavesdropper no smaller
than some prescribed level ∆. This problem was solved by Yamamoto in [16] in the specific case
in which there is no private link to the legitimate receiver, i.e., R1 = 0. However, solving it in the
general case seems to hinge upon characterizing the common information [33], [34] of the two dependent
random variables S0 and S1. To see this, consider for example the case of perfect secrecy and lossless
reconstruction, i.e., D1 = 0 and ∆ = H(S0). In this case, intuitively, every information that S1 can
give about S0 should not be transmitted over the public link, so as not to be intercepted by the
eavesdropper.
III. Secure Lossy Gray-Wyner Problems
In this section, we study the Gray-Wyner model of Figure 3. It is assumed that the alphabets S0,
S1 and S2 are finite.
A. System Models and Definitions
Consider the two classes of Gray-Wyner problems with equivocations constraints shown in Figure 3.
For convenience, first we provide full formal definitions for the model of Figure 3b; and then only
highlight the differences for the model of Figure 3a.
The lossy Gray-Wyner problem of Figure 3b is defined by a product source alphabet S0 × S1 × S2,
a joint input p.m.f. PS0,S1,S2 , a reconstruction product alphabet Sˆ1 × Sˆ2 and two distortion measures
defined, for j = 1, 2, as
d j : S j × Sˆ j → [0 : ∞)
(s j, sˆ j) → d j(s j, sˆ j) .
(20)
Definition 3. An (n,Mn,M1,n,M2,n) code for the lossy Gray-Wyner problem with equivocation constraint of
Figure 3b consists of:
i) Three message sets Mn = [1 : Mn], M1,n = [1 : M1,n] and M2,n = [1 : M2,n]
ii) Three encoding functions f , f1 and f2 defined as
f : Sn0 × Sn1 × Sn2 → [1 : Mn]
(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) → W = f (Sn0 ,Sn1 ,Sn2)
(21)
and, for j = 1, 2,
f j : Sn0 × Sn1 × Sn2 → [1 : M j,n]
(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) → W j = f j(Sn0 ,Sn1 ,Sn2) .
(22)
iii) Two decoding functions g1 and g2 defined, for j = 1, 2, as
g j : [1 : Mn] × [1 : M j,n] → Sˆn0, j × Sˆnj
(W,W j) → (Sˆn0, j, Sˆnj ) .
(23)
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The average distortions and equivocation achieved by such a code are given by
d(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) , d
(n)
2 (S
n
2 , Sˆ
n
2) and
1
n
H(Sn0 |W) ; (24)
and the probability of error about the source Sn0 is defined as
P(n)e , P
(
Sˆn0,1 , S
n
0 or Sˆ
n
0,2 , S
n
0
)
. (25)
A rate-distortion-equivocation tuple (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆) is said to be achievable for the model of Figure 3b if
there exists a sequence of codes (n,Mn,M1,n,M2,n) such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log2(Mn) ≤ R , (26a)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log2(M j,n) ≤ R j for j = 1, 2 , (26b)
lim sup
n→∞
E
(
d(n)j (S
n
j , Sˆ
n
j )
)
≤ D j for j = 1, 2 , (26c)
lim sup
n→∞
P(n)e = 0 , (26d)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn0 |W) ≥ ∆. (26e)
The rate-distortion-equivocation region for the model of Figure 3b is the set of all achievable tuples (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆).

Definition 4. For the model of Figure 3a the definition of an (n,Mn,M1,n,M2,n) code is similar to in definition 3
and is obtained by setting S0 = ∅ therein. But, the average distortions and equivocation achieved by such a
code are given by
d(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) , d
(n)
2 (S
n
2 , Sˆ
n
2) and
1
n
H(Sn1 ,S
n
2 |W) . (27)
A rate-distortion-equivocation array (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆) is said to be achievable for the model of Figure 3a if
there exists a sequence of codes (n,Mn,M1,n,M2,n) such that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log2(Mn) ≤ R , (28a)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log2(M j,n) ≤ R j for j = 1, 2 , (28b)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
Ed(n)j (S
n
j , Sˆ
n
j ) ≤ D j for j = 1, 2 , (28c)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn1 ,S
n
2 |W) ≥ ∆. (28d)
The rate-distortion-equivocation region for the model of Figure 3a is the set of all achievable tuples (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆).
B. Gray-Wyner Model with Equivocation on Both Sources
Consider the lossy Gray-Wyner model with equivocation constraint imposed on both sources of
Figure 3a. In what follows, we provide a single-letter characterization of the region of optimal tradeoffs
among rate triples (R,R1,R2), average distortion pairs (D1,D2) and equivocation level ∆. Also, we
discuss the implications of the imposed secrecy constraint on Gray-Wyner’s original network [18],
and illustrate the result through a binary example.
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1) Rate-Distortion-Equivocation Region: The following theorem states the optimal rate-distortion-
equivocation region of the Gray-Wyner model of Figure 3a. .
Theorem 4. A rate-equivocation-distortion tuple (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆) is achievable for the Gray-Wyner
model with equivocation constraint of Figure 3a if and only if
R ≥ I(U; S1,S2) , (29a)
R1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1,S2|U) , (29b)
R2 ≥ I(Sˆ2; S1,S2|U) , (29c)
∆ ≤ H(S1,S2|U) , (29d)
for some joint distribution PU,S1,S2,Sˆ1,Sˆ2 that satisfies Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 and Ed2(S2, Sˆ2) ≤ D2.
Proof. A detailed proof of Theorem 4 appears in Appendix F.  
Remark 8. It is insightful to observe that the imposed secrecy constraint changes drastically the usage of the
common and private links by the encoder in the Gray-Wyner model without secrecy constraints. To see this,
consider for example the case of lossless reconstruction and perfect secrecy, i.e., D1 = D2 = 0 and ∆ = H(S1,S2).
In this case, the encoder should send no information on the common link, even if the two sources are correlated
and/or exhibit some “common information”. In the extreme case in which S1 = S2 = S, a full description of S
is sent twice, on the two private links, even if this entails some redundancy which could be saved had there
been no secrecy constraint. 
2) Binary Example:
Consider the Gray-Wyner model with secrecy constraints of Figure 3a. Let (S1,S2) ∼ DSBS(p), for
some p ∈ [0, 12 ]. For simplicity, we focus on the lossless compression case, i.e., D1 = D2 = 0, and
symmetric rates on the private links, i.e., R1 = R2.
Without an equivocation constraint, i.e. ∆ = 0, the optimal rate region is obtained by specializing the
result of [18, Theorem 1] to this binary example. However, the optimal choice of the auxiliary random
variable involved in [18, Theorem 1] is still not known in general for the binary sources case; and
the best explicit inner bound on the region (R,R1), also provided in [18], is shown in Figure 7. It is
represented by the segments [AF], [FG] and [GB], where the corner points A,B,F and G are the points
with coordinates
A :
(
1 + h2(p), 0, 0
)
(30a)
B : (0, 1, 0) (30b)
F :
(
1,
h2(p)
2
, 0
)
(30c)
G :
1 + h2(p) − 2h2 1 −
√
1 − 2p
2
 , h2 1 −
√
1 − 2p
2
 , 0 , (30d)
and correspond respectively to the following choices of the auxiliary random variable U, U = UA ,
(S1,S2), U = UB , ∅, U = UF is obtained through time-sharing between U = S1 and U = S2, and
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U = UG , S1 ⊕U0 = S2 ⊕U0 where U0 ∼ Bern(p1), with p1 ∈ [0, 1/2] chosen such that p = 2p1 · (1 − p1),
i.e., p1 = 1/2 − (
√
1 − 2p)/2. The figure also shows an outer bound on the region (R,R1) represented
by the segments [AH] and [HB] that correspond to the intersection of the two constraints (Pangloss
planes):
R + R1 ≥ 1 (31a)
R + 2R1 ≥ 1 + h2(p) . (31b)
Conversely, in the case of perfect secrecy, i.e., ∆ = H(S1,S2) = 1 + h2(p), it is easy to see that, for this
binary example and under the constraint that R1 = R2, the region of Theorem 4 reduces the set of
rates satisfying
R1 = R2 ≥ = 1 , (32a)
R ≥ 0 . (32b)
Thus, in this case, it is optimal to transmit the source Sn1 entirely on the first private link and the
source Sn2 entirely on the second private link; and not use the public link at all. Observe that this
incurs some rate-redundancy, which is reflected, e.g., through the inequality R + 2R1 = 2 > H(S1,S2).
Furthermore, observe that the transmit strategies described by UF and UG yield levels of equivocation
given respectively by h2(p) and 2h2(p1). The associated rate-equivocation points are represented in
Figure 7 respectively as the points F˜ and G˜ with coordinates
F˜ :
(
1,
h2(p)
2
, h2(p)
)
(33a)
G˜ :
1 + h2(p) − 2h2 1 −
√
1 − 2p
2
 , h2 1 −
√
1 − 2p
2
 , 2h2 1 −
√
1 − 2p
2
 . (33b)
C. Gray-Wyner Model with Reproduction of Both Sources
Consider now the Gray-Wyner model with equivocation constraint of Figure 3b, in which the
legitimate receivers also reproduce the source Sn0 losslessly and the secrecy constraint is imposed
only on Sn0 . As we already mentioned, the component S
n
0 here may represent, e.g., some common
information of the sources Sn1 and S
n
2 – the sources S
n
1 and S
n
2 need not be independent conditionally
on Sn0 , however. Recalling that in the original Gray-Wyner network without secrecy constraints [18], the
common component of the sources that are to be conveyed the two receivers should be transmitted
over the common link, the imposed secrecy constraint creates a tension among reducing rate by
sending Sn0 on the common public link and concealing it from the eavesdropper that overhears on
this link.
1) Secure Rate-Distortion Region: The following theorem states the optimal rate-distortion region
of the Gray-Wyner model with equivocation constraint of Figure 3b in the case of perfect secrecy, i.e.,
H(Sn0 |W) = nH(S0).
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Fig. 7: Inner and outer bounds on the rate-equivocation region for the Gray-Wyner model with
equivocation constraint of Figure 3a. Case of DSBS(p) sources and symmetric rates on the private
links, i.e., R1 = R2.
Theorem 5. For the Gray-Wyner model with equivocation constraint of Figure 3b, a tuple (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆)
is achievable if and only if:
R ≥ I(U; S1,S2|S0) (34a)
R1 ≥ ∆ + I(Sˆ1; S1,S2|U,S0) (34b)
R2 ≥ ∆ + I(Sˆ2; S1,S2|U,S0) (34c)
R + R1 ≥ H(S0) + I(U, Sˆ1; S1,S2|S0) (34d)
R + R2 ≥ H(S0) + I(U, Sˆ2; S1,S2|S0) (34e)
∆ ≤ H(S0) , (34f)
for some joint distribution PU,S0,S1,S2,Sˆ1,Sˆ2 that satisfies
Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 and Ed2(S2, Sˆ2) ≤ D2. (35)
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5 appears in Appendix G. Hereafter, we provide a brief outline of the
proof of achievability. The encoder generates a lossless description of the source component Sn0 , with
rate H(S0), and uses rate splitting to transmit it on both private and common links – the rate of the
part of Sn0 that is transmitted on the public link is chosen so as to leak (H(S0)−∆) bits per sample about
Sn0 to the eavesdropper. Superimposed on this description, the encoder generates a description U
n of
the pair (Sn1 ,S
n
2) that it transmits only on the public link. Also, superimposed on both descriptions, it
sends a private description Sˆn1 of the pair (S
n
1 ,S
n
2) on the private link to the first legitimate receiver,
and a private description Sˆn2 of the pair (S
n
1 ,S
n
2) on the private link to the second legitimate receiver.
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Each legitimate receiver first recovers Sn0 losslessly from both links, and then it recovers the common
description Un from the common link. Finally, it recovers its dedicated description from its private
link. The analysis of the equivocation of this scheme shows that, although the description Un which
is sent on the public link is arbitrarily correlated with the source component to be kept secure Sn0 , it
reveals no additional information about Sn0 to the eavesdropper beyond what the part of this source
that is transmitted on the public link reveals about itself. Thus, the equivocation about the source Sn0
that is allowed by this scheme is precisely ∆. 
The following Corollary specializes the result of Theorem 5 to the case of perfect security, i.e.,
∆ = H(S0).
Corollary 4. In the case of perfect secrecy, a tuple (R,R1,R2,D1,D2) is achievable for the Gray-Wyner model
with equivocation constraint of Figure 3b if and only if:
R ≥ I(U; S1,S2|S0) (36a)
R1 ≥ H(S0) + I(Sˆ1; S1,S2|U,S0) (36b)
R2 ≥ H(S0) + I(Sˆ2; S1,S2|U,S0) , (36c)
for some joint distribution PU,S0,S1,S2,Sˆ1,Sˆ2 that satisfies
Ed1(S1, Sˆ1) ≤ D1 and Ed2(S2, Sˆ2) ≤ D2. (37)
Remark 9. It is insightful to observe that the region of Corollary 4 can be written equivalently as the set of
rate triples (R,R1,R2) that satisfy
R ≥ I(U; S1,S2|S0) , (38a)
R1 −H(S0) ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1,S2|U,S0) , (38b)
R2 −H(S0) ≥ I(Sˆ2; S1,S2|U,S0) , (38c)
for some joint PU,S0,S1,S2,Sˆ1,Sˆ2 that satisfies (35). This region can be interpreted as that of a standard Gray-Wyner
network without secrecy constraint [18] but with side information Sn0 available at the encoder and both decoders.
qed
2) Binary Example: Consider the Gray-Wyner model of Figure 3b with the following choice of the
sources S0, S1 and S2. All the sources are binary valued, (S0,S1) ∼ DSBS(p) and (S0,S2) ∼ DSBS(p)
such that S1 −
−S0 −
−S2 forms a Markov chain, as shown in Figure 8. Also, let d1 and d2 be Hamming
distortion measures. For simplicity, we concentrate on the case of lossless reconstruction of the sources
S1 and S2 at the legitimate receivers, i.e., D1 = D2; and we investigate the symmetric rate case, i.e.,
R1 = R2.
Using Corollary 4, it is easy to see that the region Rsecret of rate triples (R,R1,R2) with R1 = R2 such
that the first receiver reconstruct the pair (S0,S1) losslessly, the second receiver reconstructs the pair
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Fig. 8: Example binary sources (S0,S1,S2) for the Gray-Wyner model with equivocation constraint of
Figure 3b.
(S0,S2) losslessly, while the eavesdropper gets no information about the source component S0 is given
by
Rsecret :
 R1 = R2 ≥ 1 ,R + 2R1 ≥ 2(1 + h2(p)) . (39)
This region is represented in Figure 9 by the region delimited by the segment [AB] and the vertical
line ending at B. The corner points A and B have coordinates
A : (1 + h2(p) , 0) , (40a)
B : (1 , 2h2(p)) , (40b)
and are obtained by computing the region of Corollary 4 respectively with the choices (U, Sˆ1, Sˆ2) =
(S0,S1,S2) and (U, Sˆ1, Sˆ2) = ((S1,S2),S1,S2).
For comparison, we also investigate the region of optimal triples (R,R1,R2) for this same setting
without secrecy constraints at all. This region can be shown easily to be given by the set of rates
satisfying
R + R1 ≥ 1 + h2(p) , (41a)
R + 2R1 ≥ 1 + 2h2(p) . (41b)
It is represented in Figure 9 by the region delimited by the segments [AC] and [CD], where the points
C and D have coordinates
C : (h2(p) , 1) (42a)
D : (0 , 1 + 2h2(p)) , (42b)
and are obtained by evaluating the result of [18, Theorem 1] with the choices U = S0 and U =
(S0,S1,S2), respectively. The shaded surface represents the region of rate tuples which do not allow
perfect secure transmission of the source component Sn0 .
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
A. Proof of Converse
Let (R,R1,D1,∆) be an achievable rate-distortion-equivocation quadruple for the lossy Helper model
with equivocation constraint of Figure 2a. Let f , f1 and f2 be the associated encoding functions at the
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Fig. 9: Perfectly secure rate-region of the binary Gray-Wyner example of Figure 8.
encoder; and g the decoding function at the legitimate receiver. That is,
W = f (Sn0 ,S
n
1) , (43)
W1 = f1(Sn0 ,S
n
1) , (44)
Sˆn1 = g(W,W1) , (45)
with
Ed1(Sn1 , Sˆ
n
1) ≤ nD1 , (46)
H(Sn0 ,S
n
1 |W) ≥ n∆. (47)
Let, for i = 1, . . . ,n, the auxiliary random variable Ui defined as
Ui , (W,Si−10 ,S
i−1
1 ). (48)
First, we bound the rate of message W on the public link as follows,
n R ≥ H(W) (49a)
≥ I(W; Sn0 ,Sn1) (49b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W; S0,iS1,i|Si−10 Si−11 ) (49c)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(WSi−10 S
i−1
1 ; S0,iS1,i) (49d)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; S0,iS1,i) (49e)
where (a) holds since the sources are memoryless and (b) follows using (48).
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Similarly, the rate of message W1 on the private link can be bounded as
n R1 ≥ H(W1) (50a)
≥ H(W1|W) (50b)
≥ I(W1; Sn0Sn1 |W) (50c)
(a)
= I(W1Sˆn1 ; S
n
0S
n
1 |W) (50d)
≥ I(Sˆn1 ; Sn0Sn1 |W) (50e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆn1 ; S0,iS1,i|WSi−10 Si−11 ) (50f)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ1,i; S0,iS1,i|WSi−10 Si−11 ) (50g)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ1,i; S0,iS1,i|Ui) (50h)
where (a) holds since Sˆn1 = g(W,W1) and (b) follows using (48).
We now bound the the equivocation as,
n ∆ ≤ H(Sn0Sn1 |W) (51a)
=
n∑
i=1
H(S0,iS1,i|WSi−10 Si−11 ) (51b)
=
n∑
i=1
H(S0,iS1,i|Ui) (51c)
where the last equality follows by substituting using (48).
Let Q be an integer-valued random variable, ranging from 1 to n, uniformly distributed over [1 : n]
and independent of all other variables (S0,U,S1). We have
R ≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; S0,iS1,i) (52a)
=
n∑
i=1
P(Q = i) I(Ui; S0,iS1,i|Q = i) (52b)
= I(UQ; S0,QS1,Q|Q) (52c)
(a)
= I(UQ; S0S1|Q) (52d)
(b)
= I(Q,UQ; S0S1) (52e)
where (a) holds since the sources are i.i.d, and (b) holds since Q is independent from all other variables.
Let us now define U , (Q,UQ). Letting Sˆ1 = (Q, Sˆ1,Q), we can easily show that
R1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S0S1|U) (53)
∆ ≤ H(S0S1|U) . (54)
This completes the proof of converse of Theorem 1.
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B. Proof of Achievability
We describe briefly the codebook generation, encoding and decoding operations. The analysis of
the allowed equivocation will follow.
Codebook Generation:
i) Generate 2nR independent n-sequences un(w) indexed by w = 1, . . . , 2nR, each with i.i.d. elements
drawn according to
n∏
i=1
PU(ui(w)).
ii) For each index w, generate 2nR1 independent n-sequences sˆn1(w,w1) indexed by w1 = 1, . . . , 2
nR1 ,
each with elements drawn i.i.d. according to
n∏
i=1
PSˆ1 |U(sˆ1,i(w,w1)|ui(w)).
Encoding: Upon observing the source pair (sn0 , s
n
1), the encoder finds a pair of sequences
(
un(w), sˆn1(w,w1)
)
such that un(w), sˆn1(w,w1) and (s
n
0 , s
n
1) are jointly typical, i.e.,(
un(w), sˆn1(w,w1), s
n
0 , s
n
1
)
∈ T (n)
[USˆ1S0S1]
. (55)
If no such sequence un(w) exists, set w = 2nR + 1; and if no such sequence sˆn1(w,w1) exists, set w1 =
2nR1 + 1. The encoder then transmits the message w on the public link and the message w1 on the
private link.
Estimation at Legitimate Receiver: Upon receiving the pair of indices (w,w1), the decoder sets
sˆn1(w,w1) as the reconstructed version of the sequence S
n
1 .
Analysis of Equivocation: Le C denotes the used codebook, assumed to be known to the encoder,
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. We lower-bound the conditional entropy H(Sn0 ,S
n
1 |W) as follows.
H(Sn0 ,S
n
1 |W) =
1+2nR∑
w=1
P(W = w)H(Sn0S
n
1 |W = w) (56a)
≥
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w)H(Sn0S
n
1 |W = w) (56b)
(a)
=
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w)H
(
Sn0S
n
1 |W = w, (Sn0 ,Sn1 ,Un) ∈ T (n)[S0S1U]
)
(56c)
(b)
=
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w)H
(
Sn0S
n
1 |Un = un(w), (Sn0 ,Sn1 ,Un) ∈ T (n)[S0S1U]
)
(56d)
=
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w)H
(
Sn0S
n
1 |Un = un(w), (Sn0 ,Sn1) ∈ T (n)[S1S2 |un(w)]
)
(56e)
= −
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w)
∑
(sn0 ,s
n
1 )∈T (n)[S0S1 |un (w)]
P
(
Sn0 = s
n
0 ,S
n
1 = s
n
1 |Un = un(w)
)
× log2
(
P
(
Sn0 = s
n
0 ,S
n
1 = s
n
1 |Un = un(w)
))
(56f)
(c)≥ n
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w) [ H(S0S1|U) − n]
∑
(sn0 ,s
n
1 )∈T (n)[S0S1 |un(w)]
P
(
Sn0 = s
n
0 ,S
n
1 = s
n
1 |Un = un(w)
)
(56g)
= n [H(S0S1|U) − n]
2nR∑
w=1
PW(w) (56h)
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= n [H(S0S1|U) − n] (1 − Pn(e)) (56i)
where (a) follows by noticing that if w , 2nR +1, then the sequences un(w), sn0 and s
n
1 are jointly typical,
i.e., (sn0 , s
n
1 ,u
n(w)) ∈ T (n)[S0S1U]; (b) holds since by the code construction there is a one-to-one mapping
between the set {un} and the set of indices {w ∈ [1 : 2nR]}; and (c) holds by the conditional typicality
lemma [32, Section 2.5].
Appendix B
Proof of Corollary 1
First, note that, in the case of lossless reconstruction of the source Sn1 at the legitimate receiver,
Theorem 1 reduces to the set of triples (R,R1,∆) that satisfy
R1 ≥ H(S1|U) (57a)
R ≥ I(U; S0,S1) (57b)
∆ ≤ H(S0,S1|U) (57c)
for some conditional p.m.f. PU|S0,S1 . Let R(PU|S0,S1 ) denote such region, and
R =
⋃
PU|S0 ,S1
R(PU|S0,S1 ). (58)
Also, let R′ denote the region described by (12), i.e., R′ is the set of triples (R,R1,∆) that satisfy
R + R1 ≥ H(S1) (59a)
∆ ≤ H(S0|S1) + min{ R1, H(S1) }. (59b)
We want to show that
R = R′. (60)
It is easy to see that R ⊆ R′. Let (R,R1,∆) ∈ R′, it remains to show that (R,R1,∆) ∈ R for some choice
of PU|S0,S1 . If R1 ≥ H(S1), then the triple (R,R1,∆) satisfies (57) with the choice U = ∅, i.e., (R,R1,∆) ∈ R.
If R1 < H(S1), there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that R1 = αH(S1). Let T be a Bernoulli-α random variable
that is independent of S1. Also, let U = (T,UT), where
U{T=0} = S1 , and U{T=1} = ∅. (61)
It is easy to see that
H(S1|U) = αH(S1) = R1 . (62)
Similarly, since R + R1 ≥ H(S1), then we have
R ≥ H(S1) − R1 (63a)
= H(S1) −H(S1|U) (63b)
= I(U; S1) (63c)
= I(U; S0,S1) (63d)
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where the last equality holds since the so-defined U is such that U −
− S1 −
− S0 is a Markov chain.
Also, since by assumption ∆ ≤ H(S0|S1) + min{R1,H(S1)}, we have
∆ ≤ H(S0|S1) + H(S1|U) (64a)
(a)
= H(S0|U,S1) + H(S1|U) (64b)
= H(S0,S1|U) (64c)
where (a) follows since U satisfies the Markov chain U −
− S1 −
− S0.
The above means that the triple (R,R1,∆) satisfies (62), (63) and (64) for the given choice of PU|S0,S1 ;
and so (R,R1,∆) ∈ R. This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 2
A. Proof of Converse
Let (R,R1,D1,∆) be an achievable rate-distortion-equivocation quadruple for the Lossy Helper
model of Figure 2b. Let f and f1 denote then the associated encoding functions and g the decoding
function at the legitimate receiver. That is,
W = f (Sn0 ,S
n
1) , (65)
W1 = f1(Sn0 ,S
n
1) , (66)
Sˆn1 = g(W,W1) , (67)
where Ed(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) ≤ D1.
Using Fano’s inequality, the lossless reconstruction of the source Sn0 at the legitimate receiver yields
that there exists a sequence n, with limn→∞ n = 0, such that:
H(Sn0 |WW1) ≤ nn , (68)
Besides, one has by definition that:
H(Sn0 |W) ≥ n∆ , (69)
First, the sum-rate (R + R1) can be lower-bounded as
n (R + R1) ≥ H(W1W) (70a)
≥ I(WW1; Sn0Sn1) (70b)
≥ I(WW1; Sn0) + I(WW1; Sn1 |Sn0) (70c)
(a)≥ I(WW1; Sn0) + I(WW1Sˆn1 ; Sn1 |Sn0) (70d)
≥ I(WW1; Sn0) + I(Sˆn1 ; Sn1 |Sn0) (70e)
(b)≥ nH(S0) + I(Sˆn1 ; Sn1 |Sn0) − n n (70f)
= nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆn1 ; S1,i|S0,iSi−11 ,Si−10 ,Sn0,i+1) − n n (70g)
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(c)
= nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆn1S
i−1
1 S
i−1
0 S
n
0,i+1; S1,i|S0,i) − n n (70h)
≥ nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ1,i; S1,i|S0,i) − n n , (70i)
where (a) follows from that Sˆn1 = g(W,W1), (b) follows from (68), while (c) is a consequence of the
following Markov chain,
S1,i −
− S0,i −
− (Si−11 ,Si−10 ,Sn0,i+1) . (71)
which holds since the sources (Sn0 ,S
n
1) are memoryless.
Finally, the rate R1 on the private link can be lower-bounded as
n R1 ≥ H(W1) ≥ I(Sn0 ; W1|W)
(a)≥ H(Sn0 |W) − n n (72a)
(b)≥ n∆ − n n , (72b)
where (a) follows by using (68) and (b) using (69).
The rest of the proof of converse follows by using standard single-letterization techniques, which we
omit here for brevity. This completes the proof of the converse of Theorem 2.
B. Proof of Achievability
The coding scheme that we use for the proof of the direct part of Theorem 2 uses a careful
combination of binning and rate-splitting. Specifically, let R1 = R1,1 + R. The codebook generation,
encoding and decoding operations are as follows.
Codebook Generation:
i) Randomly and independently assign a pair of indices (w0,0,w1,0) to every sn0 ∈ T (n)[S0], where
(w0,0,w1,0) ∈ 2n(R0,0+R1,0). To every sn0 < T (n)[S0], assign (w0,0,w1,0) = (2nR0,0 + 1, 2nR1,0 + 1).
ii) For each sequence sn0 ∈ T (n)[S0], generate 2n(R1,1+R) independent sequences sˆn1(w0,1,w1,1), where (w1,0,w1,1) ∈
2n(R1,0+R1,1), each with i.i.d components drawn according to
n∏
i=1
PSˆ1 |S0 (sˆ1,i(w0,1,w1,1)|s0,i).
iii) Reveal the codebook to the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper.
Encoding: Upon observing (sn0 , s
n
1), the encoder first recovers (w0,0,w1,0) the bin indices of s
n
0 .
Then, it looks for a sequence sˆn1(w,w1) jointly typical with the sources (S
n
0 ,S
n
1), i.e(
sn0 , s
n
1 , sˆ
n
1
(
w0,1,w1,1
)) ∈ T (n)
[S0S1Sˆ1]
. (73)
If no such sequence exists, the encoder sets w1,0 = 2nR1,0 + 1 and w1,1 = 2nR1,1 + 1; if more than one
exists, it selects at random of them. The encoder sends then the messages w1 = (w1,0,w1,1) over the
private link while the message w = (w0,0,w0,1) is sent through the public link.
Decoding: Based on all received indices, the decoder first recovers the sequence Sn0 as the unique
typical sequence in the bin indexed by (w0,0,w1,0). Then, knowing sn0 , it sets its description as being
Sˆn1(w1,1,w0,1).
The encoding and decoding are successful provided that n is large enough and
R1,1 + R0,1 ≥ I(S1; Sˆ1|S0) , (74a)
R0,0 + R1,0 ≥ H(S0) . (74b)
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Equivocation Analysis: Let (Sn0 ,S
n
1) be the observed sequence and W the message sent over the public
link. For convenience let us define the index W˜ = (W0,1,W1,1), of rate R˜ = R0,1+R1,1. We start by writing
that
H(Sn0 |W) = H(Sn0 |W0,0,W0,1) ≥ H(Sn0 |W0,0,W0,1,W1,1) . (75)
The proof if two-fold and consists in establishing two main inequalities.
i) The first inqueality which writes as
H(Sn0 |W˜) ≥ H(S0) − 3nn , (76)
amounts to stating that the index W˜ is independent of Sn0 .
ii) The second inequality writes as
H(Sn0 |W0,0, W˜) ≥ nR1,0 − nn , (77)
and implies that the only secure part of Sn0 is the index transmitted over the private link.
To prove the first inequality (76), we start by writing that
H(Sn0 |W˜) = H(Sn0) + H(W˜|Sn0) −H(W˜) (78a)
≥ H(Sn0) + H(W˜|Sn0) − n R˜ . (78b)
The proof consists in proving that the difference term H(W˜|Sn0) − n R˜ in the RHS of (78b) is arbitrary
small. To this end, let us first denote E the event that an encoding error occurs and denote by E¯ its
error complement. First, observe that
H(W˜|Sn0) ≥ P(E¯)H(W˜|Sn0 , E¯) , (79)
which is a consequence of that if an error occurs, then W˜ can take only one possible value, i.e. 2nR˜ +1.
The conditional entropy H(W˜|Sn0 , E¯) on the RHS of (79) is given by
H(W˜|Sn0 , E¯) = −
∑
sn0∈T (n)[S0]
2nR˜∑
w˜=1
P(W˜ = w˜,Sn0 = s
n
0 |E¯) log2
(
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn0 = sn0 , E¯)
)
, (80)
with, for given sn0 and w˜ ∈ [1 : 2nR˜],
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) =
∑
sn1∈T (n)[S1 |sn0 ]
PnS1 |S0 (s
n
1 |sn0)P(W˜ = w˜|Sn1 = sn1 ,Sn0 = sn0 , E¯). (81)
In what follows, we compute the conditional probability P(W˜ = w˜|Sn1 = sn1 ,Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) for given (sn0 , sn1).
Let, for a given sn0 , Sˆn1(sn0) denote the set of generated sequences {sˆn1(w˜)} of the codebook, among all
possible sequences in T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn0 ]
. For a given pair (sn0 , s
n
1), if no error occurs during the encoding step, the
encoder chooses at random one sequence sˆn1(w˜) among all those that are strongly jointly typical with
the pair (sn0 , s
n
1). That is, the sequence sˆ
n
1(w˜) is chosen at random in the following intersection set
T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
∩ Sˆn1(sn0) . (82)
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For given (sn0 , s
n
1), every sequence from this intersection set has probability
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn1 = sn1 ,Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) = ||T (n)[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ] ∩ Sˆ
n
1(s
n
0)||−1×1
((
sˆn1(w˜), s
n
0 , s
n
1
)
∈ T (n)
[Sˆ1,S0,S1]
)
. (83)
Key to the rest of the proof is a counting argument that we use to bound the cardinality of the set
T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
∩Sˆn1(sn0). The result is stated in the following lemma, whose proof is relegated to Appendix D.
At this stage, we mention that a different approach to computing a probability that is similar to (83)
can be found in [35], and was also used later on in [36, Appendix A].
Lemma 1 (Encoding set cardinality bound). If R˜ ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) + 2n, the cardinality of the encoding set
T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
∩ Sˆn1(sn0) satisfies
(1 − )2n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)−2n] ≤
∥∥∥∥∥T (n)[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ] ∩ Sˆn1(sn0)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ (1 + )2n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)−2n] . (84)
Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix D. 
We continue with the analysis of the equivocation. Using (84), equation (83) gives
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn1 = sn1 ,Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) ≤ 2n[−R˜+I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)+2n]×1
(
(sˆn1(w˜), s
n
0 , s
n
1) ∈ T (n)[Sˆ1,S0,S1]
)
. (85)
Thus, the conditional probability of (81) satisfies
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) =
∑
sn1∈T (n)[S1 |sn0 ]
PnS1 |S0 (s
n
1 |sn0) P(W˜ = w˜|Sn1 = sn1 ,Sn0 = sn0 , E¯) (86a)
≤
∑
sn1∈T (n)[S1 |sˆn1 (w˜),sn0 ]
PnS1 |S0 (s
n
1 |sn0) 2n[−R˜+I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)+2n] (86b)
≤ 2n
[
H(S1 |S0Sˆ1)−H(S1 |S0)−R˜+I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)+3n
]
(86c)
≤ 2n[−R˜+3n], (86d)
where (86c) follows by using (85).
Continuing from (80), we then get
H(W˜|Sn0 , E¯) = −
∑
sn0∈T (n)[S0]
2nR˜∑
w˜=1
P(W˜ = w˜,Sn0 = s
n
0 |E¯) log2
(
P(W˜ = w˜|Sn0 = sn0 , E¯)
)
(87a)
≥ n
2nR∑
w˜=1
∑
sn0∈T (n)[S0]
P(W˜ = w˜,Sn0 = s
n
0 |E¯)
(
R˜ − 3n
)
(87b)
≥ n[R˜ − 3n], (87c)
where (87b) follows by using (86d).
Finally, using (79) and (87c), we get that the conditional entropy H(Sn0 |W˜) satisfies
H(Sn0 |W˜) ≥ nH(S0) + H(W˜|Sn0 , E¯) − n R˜ (88)
≥ nH(S0) − 3nn. (89)
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Now that we have proved that the index W˜ is independent of Sn0 , we move to prove the second
inequality (77). To this end, observe that:
H(Sn0 |W0,0, W˜) = H(Sn0 |W0,0) − I(Sn0 ; W˜|W0,0) (90a)
≥ H(Sn0 |W0,0) − I(Sn0W0,0; W˜) (90b)
(a)
= H(Sn0 |W0,0) − I(Sn0 ; W˜) (90c)
(b)≥ H(Sn0 |W0,0) − 3nn (90d)
= H(Sn0W1,0|W0,0) −H(W1,0|Sn0W0,0) − 3nn (90e)
(c)≥ H(Sn0W1,0|W0,0) − 3nn (90f)
≥ H(W1,0|W0,0) − 3nn (90g)
(d)
= H(W1,0) − 3nn (90h)
= nR1,0 − 3nn , (90i)
where (a) is a consequence of that, knowing the codebook, W0,0 is a function of Sn0 , while (b) stems
from (89). As for (c), it results from the fact that W1,0 is a function of Sn0 , and (d) is a consequence of
the random binning procedure.
Last, note a trivial bound on the leakage is given by H(S0) since 1/nH(Sn0 |W) ≤ H(S0), thus the
bound on equivocation can be rewritten as:
H(Sn0 |W0,0, W˜) ≥ n min{R1,0,H(S0)} − 3nn , (91)
Fourier Motzkin Elimination: Summarizing, the triple (R,R1,D1,∆) is achievable if there exists (R0,0,R0,1,R1,0,R1,1)
such that
R1,1 + R0,1 ≥ I(S1; Sˆ1|S0) , (92a)
R0,0 + R1,0 ≥ H(S0) , (92b)
∆ ≤ min{R1,0,H(S0)} (92c)
R1 = R1,1 + R1,0 (92d)
R = R0,0 + R0,1 (92e)
0 ≤ {R1,0,R1,1} ≤ R1 (92f)
0 ≤ {R0,0,R0,1} ≤ R (92g)
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to successively project out R0,0, R0,1, R1,0 and R1,1), we get the
region of Theorem 2. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Appendix D
Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the definition of the set T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
∩Sˆn1(sn0) as given in Appendix C. (See Figure 10 for a schematic
representation). The cardinality of this set is a random variable, which we denote hereafter as C, i.e.,
C , ||T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
∩ Sˆn1(sn0)|| . (93)
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Fig. 10: Encoding set for a fixed pair (sn0 , s
n
1)
Using Tchebychev-Bienayme’s inequality, one gets that, for  ≥ 0,
P
(
|C − E(C)| ≥ E(C)
)
≤ Var(C)
2E2(C)
, (94)
where Var(C) designates the variance of the random variable C.
For convenience, let the following substitutions and notations,
N , ||T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn0 ]
|| , B , ||T (n)
[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ]
|| , and K , ||Sˆn1(sn0)|| = 2nR˜ . (95)
The random variable C follows a Hyper-Geometric distribution; and the probability that it takes some
value j, with 1 ≤ j ≤ min{B,K}, is given by
PC( j) =
 Bj

 N − BK − j

 NK

−1
. (96)
The expectation and variance of this variable are given respectively by
E(C) =
BK
N
, and Var(C) =
BK
N
N − B
N
N − K
N − 1 . (97)
Substituting in (97) using (95), and using the joint typicality lemma [32, page 29] and the conditional
typicality lemma [32, page 27], we get
2n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)−2n] ≤ E(C) ≤ 2n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)+2n] , (98a)
Var(C) ≤ BK
N
≤ 2n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)+2n] . (98b)
Next, using (98), the inequality (94) gives that, for all  ≥ 0, we have
P
(
|C − E(C)|≥E(C)
)
≤ 1
2
2−n[R˜−I(Sˆ1;S1 |S0)−2n] . (99)
The above means that, if R˜ ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) + 2n, then for  ≥ 0, the probability P
(
|C − E(C)| < E(C)
)
tends to unity as n −→ ∞. Finally using (98), this leads to the desired result; and completes the proof
of Lemma 1. 
Appendix E
Encryption-based coding scheme
In this section we show that, if the optimal rate-distortion region given in Theorem 2 suggests that
the source S0 be compressed over the private link of rate R1, one could equally optimally transmit
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the source S0 on the common link, provided a key of rate at least equal to H(S0) be used to encrypt
it. Thus, the communication on the public link is not prevented, however, it has to be secured.
We describe hereafter the corresponding encryption-based coding scheme in which the private link
is used as a private key to encrypt the common link transmission. The codebook generation, encoding
and decoding are as follows.
Codebook generation:
i) Randomly and independently assign to each sn0 ∈ T (n)[S0] a triplet of bin indices (w˜0,w0,0,w1,0) ∈ [1 :
2nR˜0 ] × [1 : 2nR0,0 ] × [1 : 2nR1,0 ]. Assign to each sn0 < T (n)[S0] an error triplet given by (w˜0,w0,0,w1,0) =
(2nR˜0 + 1, 2nR0,0 + 1, 2nR1,0 + 1).
ii) For each sn0 , generate independently 2
n(R˜1+R1,1+R0,1) sequences sˆn1(w˜1,w1,1,w0,1) where w˜1,w1,1,w0,1 ∈
[1 : 2nR˜1 ]×[1 : 2nR1,1 ]×[1 : 2nR0,1 ], with i.i.d components drawn according to
n∏
i=1
PSˆ1 |S0 (sˆ1,i(w˜1,w1,1,w0,1)|s0,i).
Encoding: Upon observing (sn0 , s
n
1), the encoder recovers the indices assigned to s
n
0 , i.e. (w˜0,w0,0,w1,0),
and then looks for a triplet of indices (w˜1,w1,1,w0,1) such that:(
sˆn1(w˜1,w1,1,w0,1), s
n
0 , s
n
1
)
∈ T (n)
[Sˆ1S0S1]
, (100)
It then transmits the indices (w˜1,w1,1,w1,0) on the private link and transmits the indices (w˜0⊕w˜1,w0,0,w0,1)
on the public link, where the XOR operation ⊕ is performed bit-wise to encrypt the index w˜0.
Decoding: Based on the received indices, the decoder first recovers the sequence sn0 and then, recovers
sn1 similarly.
The decoding is successful if:
R˜0 + R0,0 + R1,0 ≥ H(S0) (101a)
R˜1 + R0,1 + R1,1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) (101b)
Besides, in order for the encryption to be successful, we impose that:
R˜1 ≥ R˜0 . (102)
In the following, we analyse the resulting equivocation, or equivalently, the induced rate leakage,
at the eavesdropper about the source sn0 to be secured,
Equivocation Analysis: The leakage at the eavesdropper could result from the three indices trans-
mitted on the public link, i.e. W˜0 ⊕ W˜1, W0,1 and W0,0.
In the following, we bound the leakage of each of the aforementioned indices.
We start the analysis by writing:
I(W; Sn0) = I
(
W˜0 ⊕ W˜1,W0,0,W0,1; Sn0
)
(103a)
= I
(
W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; Sn0
)
+ I
(
W0,1; Sn0 |W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
+ I
(
W0,0; Sn0 |W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
. (103b)
To bound the three RHS terms of (103b), we will introduce four crucial results.
• The first result we will resort to consists in stating that, similarly to the equivocation analysis in
the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix C, (W˜1,W0,1,W1,1) are asymptotically independent of sn0 , i.e.
there exists n such that:
I
(
W˜1W0,1W1,1; Sn0
)
≤ nn . (104)
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• Next, since W˜1 is independent of Sn0 , and since W˜0 is a function of S
n
0 , then, following Shannon’s
one time-pad proof, there exists n such that:
I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; W˜0) ≤ nn (105)
• Since sˆn1 are chosen randomly in the set of conditionally typical sequences T (n)[Sˆ1 |sn1 ,sn0 ], then the two
sub-indices appear as independent of each other
I
(
W0,1; W˜1|Sn0
)
≤ nn . (106)
• Finally, since sn0 are assigned at random to their bin indices, then for all
(
w˜0,w0,0,w1,0
) ∈ [1 : 2nR˜0]×[
1 : 2nR0,0
]
×
[
1 : 2nR1,0
]
,
P(W˜0 = w˜0,W0,0 = w0,0,W1,0 = w1,0) = 2−nR˜0 2−nR0,0 2−nR1,0 , (107)
which implies that:
H(W˜0,W0,1|W0,0) = H(W˜0) + H(W0,1) . (108)
We proceed with the analysis as follows:
I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; Sn0) ≤ I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; Sn0W˜0) (109a)
= I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; Sn0 |W˜0) + I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; W˜0) (109b)
(a)≤ I(W˜0 ⊕ W˜1; Sn0 |W˜0) + nn (109c)
= I(W˜1; Sn0 |W˜0) (109d)
≤ I(W˜1; Sn0) (109e)
(b)≤ nn (109f)
where (a) is a result of (105) while (b) results from (104).
As for the second term of the RHS of (103b), note that:
I
(
W0,1; Sn0 |W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
≤ I
(
W0,1; Sn0 , W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
(110a)
= I
(
W0,1; Sn0
)
+ I
(
W0,1; W˜0 ⊕ W˜1|Sn0
)
(110b)
(a)
= nn + I
(
W0,1; W˜1|Sn0
)
(110c)
(b)≤ 2nn . (110d)
where (a) results from (104) and (b) stems from (106).
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Now, to bound the last term of the RHS of (103b), we can write that:
I
(
W0,0; Sn0 |W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
= H
(
Sn0 |W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
−H
(
Sn0 |W0,0,W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
(111a)
≤ H(Sn0) −H
(
Sn0 |W0,0,W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1
)
(111b)
(a)
= H(Sn0) −H(Sn0 |W0,0) + nn (111c)
= H(Sn0) −H(Sn0W1,0W˜0|W0,0) + H(W1,0W˜0|Sn0W0,0) + nn (111d)
(b)
= H(Sn0) −H(Sn0W1,0W˜0|W0,0) + nn (111e)
≤ H(Sn0) −H(W1,0W˜0|W0,0) + nn (111f)
(c)
= nH(S0) − n(R1,0 + R˜0) + nn (111g)
where (a) follows from that (W0,1, W˜0 ⊕ W˜1) are almost independent of (Sn0 ,W0,0), and (b) is a result of
that the pair of indices (W1,0, W˜0) are a function of Sn0 , while (c) is a consequence of (108).
Combining thus the inequalities in (109f), (110d) and (111g), we can write:
I(W; Sn0) ≤ nH(S0) − n(R1,0 + R˜0) + 4nn (112)
which implies that:
H(Sn0 |W) ≥ n(R1,0 + R˜0) − 4nn (113)
which ends the equivocation analysis.
Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: We resort to Fourier-Motzkin Elimination on the set of inequalities and
equalities given by:
R1 = R˜1 + R1,0 + R1,1 (114a)
R = R˜0 + R0,0 + R0,1 (114b)
R˜0 + R0,0 + R1,0 ≥ H(S0) (114c)
R˜1 + R0,1 + R1,1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) (114d)
R˜1 ≥ R˜0 (114e)
∆ ≤ R1,0 + R˜0 , (114f)
along with positivity constraints, to obtain the desired rate region:
R + R1 ≥ H(S0) + I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) (115a)
R + R1 ≥ ∆ + I(Sˆ1; S1|S0) (115b)
∆ ≤ min{H(S0),R1} (115c)
Appendix F
Proof of Theorem 4
A. Proof of Converse
Let (R,R1,D1,D2,∆) be an achievable rate-distortion-equivocation tuple for the lossy Gray-Wyner
model with equivocation constraint of Figure 3a. Let f , f1 and f2 be the associated encoding functions
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at the encoder; and g1 and g2 the decoding functions at the legitimate receivers. That is,
W = f (Sn1 ,S
n
2) (116)
W1 = f1(Sn1 ,S
n
2) (117)
W2 = f2(Sn1 ,S
n
2) (118)
Sˆn1 = g1(W,W1) (119)
Sˆn2 = g2(W,W2), (120)
with
Ed(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) ≤ nD1, Ed(n)2 (Sn2 , Sˆn2) ≤ nD2 and H(Sn1 ,Sn2 |W) ≥ n∆. (121)
Let, for i = 1, . . . ,n, the auxiliary random variable Ui defined as
Ui , (W,Si−11 ,S
i−1
2 ). (122)
First, we lower bound the rate R of message W as follows,
n R ≥ H(W) (123a)
≥ I(W; Sn1Sn2) (123b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W; S1,iS2,i|Si−11 Si−12 ) (123c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(WSi−11 S
i−1
2 ; S1,iS2,i) (123d)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; S1,iS2,i) (123e)
where the last equality follows by substituting using (122).
Similarly, for j = 1, 2, we lower bound the rate R j of message W j as
n R j ≥ H(W j) (124a)
≥ H(W j|W) (124b)
≥ I(W j; Sn1Sn2 |W) (124c)
(a)
= I(W jSˆnj ; S
n
1S
n
2 |W) (124d)
≥ I(Sˆnj ; Sn1Sn2 |W) (124e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆnj ; S1,iS2,i|WSi−11 Si−12 ) (124f)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ j,i; S1,iS2,i|WSi−11 Si−12 ) (124g)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ j,i; S1,iS2,i|Ui) , (124h)
where (a) holds since Sˆnj = g j(W,W j); and (b) follows by substituting using (122).
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The equivocation can be upper-bounded easily, as
n ∆ ≤ H(Sn1Sn2 |W) (125a)
=
n∑
i=1
H(S1,iS2,i|WSi−11 Si−12 ) (125b)
=
n∑
i=1
H(S1,iS2,i|Ui), (125c)
where, similarly to the above, the last equality follows by substituting using (122).
The rest of the proof of converse follows using standard single-letterization techniques, and is omitted
for brevity. 
B. Proof of Achievability
The coding scheme that we use for the proof of the direct part of Theorem 4 is a straightforward
extension of that of the Helper model with equivocation on both sources in Appendix A to the case
of two legitimate receivers. For this reason, hereafter, we only outline the main steps, and omit the
details.
Codebook Generation:
i) Generate 2nR independent n-sequences un(w) indexed by w = 1, . . . , 2nR, each with i.i.d elements
drawn according to
n∏
i=1
PU(ui(w)).
ii) For each w ∈ [1 : 2nR], generate 2nR1 independent n-sequences sˆn1(w,w1) indexed by w1 = 1, . . . , 2nR1 ,
each with i.i.d. elements drawn according to the conditional
n∏
i=1
PSˆ1 |U(sˆ1,i(w,w1)|ui(w)).
iii) Similarly, for each w ∈ [1 : 2nR], generate 2nR2 independent n-sequences sˆn2(w,w2) indexed by w2 =
1, . . . , 2nR2 , each with i.i.d. elements drawn according to the conditional
n∏
i=1
PSˆ2 |U(sˆ2,i(w,w2)|ui(w)).
Encoding: Upon observing a pair of sources (sn1 , s
n
2), the encoder first finds an index w ∈ [1 : 2nR]
such that un(w) is jointly typical with the pair (sn1 , s
n
2), i.e.,(
un(w), sn1 , s
n
2
)
∈ T (n)[US1S2] . (126)
The encoding at this step can be performed with vanishing probability of error as long as n is large
and
R ≥ I(U; S1S2). (127)
Then, the encoder looks for a pair of sequences sˆn1(w,w1) and sˆ
n
2(w,w2) such that, for j = 1, 2, sˆ
n
j (w,w j)
is jointly typical with the triple (un(w), sn1 , s
n
2), i.e.,(
un(w), sn1 , s
n
2 , sˆ
n
j (w,w j)
)
∈ T (n)
[S1S2USˆ j]
. (128)
Similarly, the encoding at this step can be performed successfully as long as n is large and
R1 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1S2|U) (129a)
R2 ≥ I(Sˆ2; S1S2|U) . (129b)
The encoder transmits the index w on the common public link, the index w1 on the private link to
the first legitimate receiver and the index w2 on the private link to the second legitimate receiver.
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Estimation: Both legitimate receivers get the index w on the common public link; and Legitimate
Receiver j, j = 1, 2, also gets the index w j on its dedicated private link. Then, Legitimate Receiver j,
j = 1, 2, sets its reconstruction of source snj as sˆ
n
j (w,w j).
Equivocation Analysis: The analysis of the equivocation level that is achieved by this coding scheme
follows straightforwardly from that in Appendix A for the Helper problem with equivocation con-
straint of Figure 2a by simply substituting (Sn0 ,S
n
1) therein with (S
n
1 ,S
n
2); and, hence, is omitted for
brevity.
Appendix G
Proof of Theorem 5
A. Proof of Converse:
Let (R,R1,R2,D1,D2) be an achievable rate-distortion tuple for the lossy Gray-Wyner model of
Figure 3b. Let f , f1 and f2 denote the associated encoding functions at the encoder; and g1 and g2
the decoding functions at the legitimate receivers. That is,
W = f (Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) , (130)
W1 = f1(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) , (131)
W2 = f2(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ,S
n
2) , (132)
Sˆn1 = g1(W,W1) , (133)
Sˆn2 = g2(W,W2) , (134)
with
Ed(n)1 (S
n
1 , Sˆ
n
1) ≤ nD1 and Ed(n)2 (Sn2 , Sˆn2) ≤ nD2. (135)
First, using Fano’s inequality, the assumption of lossless reconstruction of the source component Sn0
at both legitimate receivers yield that there exists n with limn→∞ n = 0 such that
H(Sn0 |W,W1) ≤ nn , (136a)
H(Sn0 |W,W2) ≤ nn, (136b)
and, by definition, we have
H(Sn0 |W) ≥ n∆ (137)
Let, for i = 1, . . . ,n, the auxiliary random variable Ui defined as
Ui , (W,Si−11 ,S
i−1
2 ,S
i−1
0 ,S
n
0,i+1). (138)
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First, we lower bound the rate of message W as
n R ≥ H(W) (139a)
≥ I(W; Sn0Sn1Sn2) (139b)
≥ I(W; Sn1Sn2 |Sn0) (139c)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W; S1,iS2,i|Sn0 ,Si−11 ,Si−12 ) (139d)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W,Si−10 ,S
n
0,i+1,S
i−1
1 ,S
i−1
2 ; S1,iS2,i|S0,i) (139e)
(b)≥
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; S1,i,S2,i|S0,i) , (139f)
where (a) holds since the sources are memoryless; and (b) follows by substituting using (138).
Next, we lower bound the rate of message W j, j = 1, 2, as
n R j ≥ H(W j) (140a)
≥ H(W j|W) (140b)
≥ I(W j; Sn0Sn1Sn2 |W) (140c)
= I(W j; Sn0 |W) + I(W j; Sn1Sn2 |WSn0) (140d)
(a)≥ H(Sn0 |W) + I(W j; Sn1Sn2 |WSn0) − n n (140e)
(b)≥ n∆ + I(W j; Sn1Sn2 |WSn0) − n n (140f)
(c)≥ n∆ + I(Sˆnj ; Sn1Sn2 |WSn0) − n n (140g)
= n∆ +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆnj ; S1,iS2,i|WSn0Si−11 Si−12 ) − n n (140h)
(d)
= n∆ +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆnj ; S1,iS2,i|S0,i,Ui) − n n (140i)
≥ n∆ +
n∑
i=1
I(Sˆ j,i; S1,iS2,i|S0,iUi) − n n, (140j)
where (a) follows by using (142); (b) follows by using (137); (c) holds since Sˆnj is a deterministic
function of the messages (W,W j); and (d) follows by substituting using (138).
Similarly, for j ∈ [1 : 2], we write that
n (R + R j) ≥ H(W) + H(W1) (141a)
≥ H(WW j) (141b)
≥ I(WW j; Sn0Sn1Sn2) (141c)
= I(WW j; Sn0) + I(WW j; S
n
1S
n
2 |Sn0) (141d)
(a)≥ I(WW j; Sn0) + I(WSˆnj ; Sn1Sn2 |Sn0) (141e)
≥ H(Sn0) + I(WSˆnj ; Sn1Sn2 |Sn0) − nn (141f)
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≥ nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(WSˆ j,i; S1,iS2,i|S0,iSi−11 ,Si−12 Si−10 Sn0,i+1) − nn (141g)
(a)
= nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(WSi−11 S
i−1
2 S
i−1
0 S
n
0,i+1Sˆ j,i; S1,iS2,i|S0,i) − nn (141h)
(b)≥ nH(S0) +
n∑
i=1
I(UiSˆ j,i; S1,i,S2,i|S0,i) − nn, (141i)
where (a) holds since Sˆnj is a function of (W,W j), and (b) follows from that the sources are memoryless.
Finally, a trivial bound on the equivocation can be written as follows:
n∆ ≤ H(Sn0 |W) (142a)
≤ H(Sn0) (142b)
= nH(S0) . (142c)
The rest of the proof of converse follows using standard single-letterization techniques; and is omitted
for brevity.
B. Proof of Achievability:
The achievability proof can be outlined as follows. The first stage of the coding scheme consists in
compressing the common source Sn0 to be secured through the private links and the common link as
well, yielding thus a given leakage at the eavesdropper on this public link. Once Sn0 is decoded at
both terminals, it serves as side information available at all terminals to apply a Gray-Wyner code
conditioned on it. Such a code consists in compressing jointly the two sources (Sn1 ,S
n
2) on the common
link with a common description Un, and then, transmitting individual descriptions Sˆn1 and Sˆ
n
2 , each
on a private link, to refine the common description Un. Since this encoding is performed conditioned
on Sn0 , a similar argument to the one used in the proof of Theorem 2 is called here, to show that no
information is leaked in this second stage of the coding scheme. The codebook generation, encoding
and decoding are detailed in the following.
Codebook Generation:
i) Assign to each sequence sn0 ∈ T (n)[S0] independently and at random a pair of indices (w0, w¯0) ∈ [1 :
2nR0 ] × [1 : 2nR¯0 ], and an error pair of indices (w0, w¯0) = (1 + 2nR0 , 1 + 2nR¯0 ) to every sn0 < T (n)[S0].
ii) For each sn0 , generate 2
nR sequences un(w) where w ∈ [1 : 2nR], with i.i.d components drawn
following
n∏
i=1
PU|S0 (ui(w)|s0,i).
iii) For each sn0 and u
n(w), generate 2n(R j−R0) sequences sˆnj (w,w j) where w j ∈ [1 : 2n(R j−R0)] following
n∏
i=1
PSˆ j |US0 (sˆ j,i(w,w j)|s0,i,ui(w)).
Encoding: Upon observing Sn0 , the encoder:
• Finds the bin indices (w0, w¯0) of sn0 .
• Finds a sequence un(w) jointly typical with the sources (sn0 , s
n
1 , s
n
2), i.e.(
un(w), sn0 , s
n
1 , s
n
2
)
∈ T (n)[US0S1S2] . (143)
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• Then, for j ∈ {1, 2}, finds a sequence sˆnj (w,w j) such that:(
un(w), sˆnj (w,w j), s
n
0 , s
n
1 , s
n
2
)
∈ T (n)
[USˆ jS0S1S2]
. (144)
• Transmits the indices w0 and w j on each of the private links, then transmit w and w0¯ on the
common link.
Estimation: Each of the decoders first recovers the sequence sn0 and the sequence u
n(w). Upon
decoding both sequences, they each set their reconstruction as sˆnj (w,w j).
The encoding and decoding are successful provided that n is large and the following set of con-
straints is verified:
R0 + R¯0 ≥ H(S0) (145a)
R − R¯0 ≥ I(U; S1S2|S0) (145b)
R1 − R0 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1S2|US0) (145c)
R2 − R0 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1S2|US0) . (145d)
Equivocation Analysis: The analysis of the equivocation level that is achieved by this coding
scheme follows straightforwardly from that in Appendix A for the Helper problem with equivocation
constraint of Figure 2b by simply substituting Sn1 therein with (S
n
1 ,S
n
2); and, hence, is omitted for
brevity. The resulting bound on the equivocation level at the eavesdropper about the source sn0 is
given by:
∆ ≤ min{R0,H(S0)} . (146)
Fourier-Motzkin Elimination: Summarizing, the tuple (R,R1,R2,D1,D2,∆) is achievable if there exists
(R0, R¯1) such that
R0 + R¯0 ≥ H(S0) (147a)
R − R¯0 ≥ I(U; S1S2|S0) (147b)
R1 − R0 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1S2|US0) (147c)
R2 − R0 ≥ I(Sˆ1; S1S2|US0) (147d)
∆ ≤ min{H(S0),R0} (147e)
0 ≤ R0 ≤ R1 (147f)
0 ≤ R¯0 ≤ R (147g)
Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to successively project out R0, and R¯0, we complete the proof of
Theorem 5.
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